---
date: '2025-12-18'
description: epistemic attitudes towards a proposition, often observed in beliefs.
id: doxastic attitude
modified: 2026-06-05 15:08:20 GMT-04:00
tags:
  - philosophy
title: doxastic attitude
created: '2025-12-18'
published: '2025-12-18'
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slug: thoughts/doxastic-attitude
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---
## voluntarism

A doxastic attitude is an attitude toward a proposition. The coarse cases are belief, disbelief, and suspension of judgment. For proposition $p$, I can believe $p$, disbelieve $p$, or suspend judgment about $p$.

Doxastic voluntarism asks whether these attitudes are under the will. I can choose to investigate evidence, avoid a source, or rehearse an argument. Directly choosing belief is harder. I cannot believe $p$ in the same way I can choose to raise my hand.

Responsibility shifts upstream. I may not be able to choose belief directly, but I can choose what evidence I seek and when I stop checking.

re [doxastic voluntarism](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/doxastic-voluntarism/)