---
date: '2025-11-10'
description: what Mary learns and what physicalism misses
id: knowledge-argument
modified: 2026-06-05 15:08:20 GMT-04:00
seealso:
  - '[[thoughts/qualia]]'
  - '[[thoughts/functionalism]]'
  - '[[thoughts/philosophical zombies]]'
socials:
  sep: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia-knowledge/
  wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Knowledge_argument
tags:
  - pattern
title: knowledge argument
created: '2025-11-10'
published: '2025-11-10'
pageLayout: default
slug: thoughts/knowledge-argument
permalink: https://aarnphm.xyz/thoughts/knowledge-argument.md
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---
Mary knows every physical fact about color vision before she ever sees color. When she sees red, Jackson’s original claim is that she learns a new fact, so complete physical knowledge did not give her all the facts. \[@jackson1982epiphenomenalqualia; @jackson1986whatmary\]

the reply menu:

- ability reply: Mary gains a new ability, such as recognizing and imagining red, rather than a new fact. \[@lewis1988know; @nemirow1990physicalism\]
- acquaintance reply: Mary gains direct acquaintance with red experience, rather than a new public fact.
- phenomenal concept reply: Mary gains a first-person concept for a fact she already knew physically. \[@loar1990phenomenal\]
- Jackson later backs away from the anti-physicalist conclusion. \[@jackson1998argument\]

what this note tests is completeness. If a finished physical theory leaves Mary ignorant of what red is like, [[thoughts/physicalism]] owes a story that explains the ignorance without adding a new nonphysical fact.