Of Corporations, Courts, Personhood, and Morality

The following in an excerpt of a paper I wrote for my coursework.

Question

Read “Of Corporations, Courts, Personhood, and Morality. Business Ethics Quarterly, 25(4), 415-431.” (Blair, 2015)

After reading this paper and in consideration of objective reality, subjective reality and legal fiction, do you think corporations should be regarded as separate legal “persons”? Do you agree with Prof. Thomas Donaldson’s vision of corporations as “moral” persons? Why or why not? How does the concept of corporate “personhood” influence our thinking about the social responsibilities of corporations?

Corporate personhood posits complex philosophical challenges that intersect with practical questions of morality, responsibility and social impact. While corporations have historically been granted legal personhood to facilitate commerce and establish clear rules of operation (Blair, 2015), this legal fiction deserves a thorough examination to determine its ethical validity in the 21st century. The essay posits that corporations should not be considered as separate legal “persons” and should be limited to a practical legal framework while strongly opposing (Donaldson, 1984) vision of treating corporations as moral agents.

Against Donaldson’s argument

Legally, corporations are treated as separate entities, allowing them to own property, enter contracts, and be liable for debts independent of their shareholders. (Blair, 2015) highlights that this legal fiction facilitates economic growth by encouraging investment and risk-taking. The objective reality is that corporations are collectives of individuals, and legal personhood is a tool for managing complex economic activities. However, conflating this legal construct with moral personhood is problematic.

(Donaldson, 1984) posits that corporations are moral agents capable of ethical reasoning and responsibility. However, Kant’s categorical imperative challenges this very notion. Kantian ethics require autonomous agents capable of rational decision-making and moral consideration for others (Kant, 1785). Corporations, driven primarily by profit maximisation, lack the capacity for moral autonomy. Their decision-making processes are constrained by shareholder interests and market forces, limiting their ability to act out of duty or universal moral laws.

(Deleuze & Guattari, 1972)‘s critique further elucidates the inherent contradictions within Capitalism and Schizophrenia systems. They argue that capitalism dissolves traditional structures and encourages an unrestrained pursuit of profit and market power. Under this framework, corporations act as agents of “deterritorialisation”—entities that disrupt established social norms in their relentless pursuit of growth. When corporations are granted personhood, they influence and shape the socio-political landscape, often without meaningful accountability. This “schizophrenic” drive for growth highlights the ethical risks associated with conflating corporate interests with those of individuals.

(Chomsky, 1999) further argues that corporations, empowered by neo-liberal policies, often operate contrary to the public good, undermining democratic processes and social welfare. This perspective reinforces the view that corporations lack the moral orientation necessary to be considered moral persons.

While Donaldson’s vision of corporations as “moral persons” attempts to impose ethical obligations on corporate behaviour, it fails to address the fundamental contradiction between profit-driven corporate structure and genuine moral agency. “True” moral personhood requires the capacity for autonomous ethical reasoning and the ability to act against self-interest when morally required. Corporate fiduciary duties to shareholders, as highlighted in the Delaware court decisions discussed in (Blair, 2015), structurally prevent this kind of authentic moral reasoning.

Implications on social responsibility

By treating corporations as persons, we risk anthropomorphising entities that are fundamentally tools of capital accumulation. (Zuboff, 2020) describes how corporations exploit personal data for profit, often at the expense of individual privacy and autonomy, with the rise of surveillance capitalism. Similarly, (CRAWFORD, 2021) demonstrates the deployment of AI to optimise corporate efficiency often lacks moral oversight, exacerbating inequalities and affecting marginalised communities disproportionately.

Recognising corporations are not moral agents; we shift the onus onto legal frameworks and societal pressures to enforce ethical behaviour. This understanding aligns with the objective reality of corporations as collections of individuals whose actions must be guided by laws and norms rather than assumed moral capacities.

In conclusion, corporate personhood should be recognised as a limited legal fiction rather than a morally meaningful form. While legal personhood serves practical functions in commerce and law, extending this to claims of moral personhood obscures the need for external regulation and democratic oversight of corporate power. Instead of expecting corporations to embody moral principles, society should strengthen regulatory frameworks that ensure corporate actions align with the broader public interest, especially in the era of AI and data capitalism. ¹