truth.
Nietzsche critiques the traditional approaches of truth. Nietzsche argues that philosophical thinking, like all conscious thinking, is driven by “instinctive” psychological forces, underneath which lie “valuations or, more clearly, physiological demands for the preservation of a certain type of life.”
What we really value is not truth, but survival, he says. He resists “accustomed value feelings,” and wants to go “beyond good and evil” (201)
power.
rationality
But this relief seems to be a negative rather than a positive character. Shall we then say that the feeling of rationality is constituted merely by the absence of any feeling of irrationality?
Just as we feel no particular pleasure when we breathe freely, but a very intense feeling of distress when the respiratory motions are prevented,—so any unobstructed tendency to action discharges itself without the production of much cogitative accompaniment, and any perfectly fluent course of thought awakens but little feeling; but when the movement is inhibited, or when the thought meets with difficulties, we experience distress. It is only when the distress is upon us that we can be said to strive, to crave, or to aspire.
Lien vers l'originalAll feeling whatever, in the light of certain recent psychological speculations, seems to depend for its physical condition not on simple discharge of nerve-currents, but on their discharge under arrest, impediment, or resistance.